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Introduction
One of the key objectives of the creation of a single market in Europe has been to level the playing field in the corporate sector in order to enhance competition and innovation. This is equally true with respect to finance. Despite the introduction of the euro and the liberalisation and harmonisation of the regulatory side of the financial services industry as a result of two banking directives and the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), retail banking remains, however, largely a national affair. Cross-border retail lending generally accounts for less than one percent of total lending (see Gropp and Kashyap, 2009 ). This de facto national segmentation justifies the use of national bank lending rates to assess whether or not the costs of corporate debt financing are converging across the euro area. This paper aims at precisely that.
Previous studies (see, among others, Adam et al., 2002; Baele et al., 2004; Kleimeier and Sander, 2006; Vajanne, 2007) so far have found evidence for falling cross-country variance in loan rates (σ -convergence) but little or ambiguous evidence for stationarity of loan rate spreads to a benchmark (lack of β -convergence). On the one hand, σconvergence suggests that the process of bank market integration is ongoing. On the other hand, the β -convergence results do not exclude the fact that loan rates may drift apart. For example, by estimating cointegration relationships Kleimeier and Sander (2006) find that all bi-lateral relationships between German rates and other national rates are unstable, showing absence of convergence.
We introduce an additional convergence measure to reassess whether retail bank market integration is absent, ongoing, or complete. Note that both the σ -convergence and β -convergence criteria capture long-term trends. There is also the question of whether rates move synchronously in their short-term fluctuations. Such correlation would be the result of national rates following common external factors, for example the European Central Bank (ECB) re-financing rate. In an integrated market national factors should not play a significant role, insofar as they are unrelated to country-specific risk or heterogeneity in demand for financial services.
This brings us to the concept of factor convergence. Factor analysis is applied to decompose the loan rates in a number of latent factors where each factor is multiplied by country-specific factor sensitivities, so-called 'factor loadings'. Loan rates are said to exhibit (weak) factor convergence when all factor loadings are significant and all loadings associated with one common factor have the same sign. There are, then, no statistically significant country-specific dynamic factors. Factor convergence is complete when factor loadings are the same for all countries (= strong factor convergence). Factor convergence is absent when some factor loadings (of a significant factor) are insignificant or of different sign. Note that factor convergence captures the synchronisation of interest rate movements but ignores time-invariant differences in the absolute levels. The latent factors are found by maximum likelihood factor analysis following Jöreskog (1969) . Strong factor convergence implies complete β -convergence, and vice versa, in the sense that one can find a benchmark rate for which all spreads are stationary and white noise. In contrast, weak factor convergence does not necessarily imply β -convergence, neither complete nor incomplete. Nor does incomplete βconvergence, i.e. when spreads are stationary but auto-correlated, imply weak factor convergence.
This study tests the law of one price in the corporate loan market from a lender's point of view. The threat of foreign entry and competition from alternative funding sources such as bond financing can be the driving factors enforcing this law. Gropp and Kashyap (2009) suggest analysing the convergence of bank profits rather than prices of financial products. 1 They argue that the absence of homogeneous loan pricing does not imply absence of retail banking integration due to differences in tax systems, borrowers' preferences, etc., meaning that the reason for price differences should not necessarily be sought on the supply side. This seems a valid point concerning part of the cross-country differences in loan rates.
In addition to differences in tax and legal systems, interest rate differences may stem from a variety of other factors. First, national bank loan portfolios may differ in their risk profile. Idiosyncratic risk is diversified but systematic (countrywide) risk may differ, especially when the share of small businesses in the loan portfolio is high. Second, differences in inflation expectations may affect nominal rates. This effect is likely to be increasing in the share of local bank investors, because real returns must take into account consumer price inflation in the investor's country of residence. International investors holding well-diversified portfolios are less affected by cross-country differences in both inflation and risk. Third, there can be heterogeneity in loan products across countries due, for instance, to differences in collateral practices (see ECB, 2006) .
Fourth, there can be differences in deposit rates. This could lead to differences in loan rates even if the interest mark-up was the same.
Since the objective of this paper is to assess whether there is a level playing field in firm debt financing, and not to explain differences (as Affinito and Farabullini, 2009) do), loan rates should not be adjusted for differences in competitive conditions (see Maudos and Guevara, 2004) or cost efficiency (see, among others, Casu et al., 2004; Schure et al., 2004) in banking. However, we adjust loan rates for differences in systematic risk (first factor) and inflation (second factor) to the extent that these variables can explain variation in loan rates across countries and over time. Unfortunately there is no obvious way of adjusting national loan rates for heterogeneity in loan products (third factor). Country fixed effects could capture at least part of such heterogeneity, but could also be attributed to many other factors, including those for which one should not adjust such as bank inefficiency. Hence, no adjustment is made for the third factor. Finally, in many cases differences in rates on Non-Financial Corporations' (NFCs) deposits (fourth factor) cannot account for differences in loan rates. In fact for some countries where loan rates are relatively high, deposit rates are relatively low. This means that mark-up differences can be even bigger than differences in loan rates. The cross-country relationship between deposit rates and loan rates is statistically insignificant, which made us decide to ignore deposit rates.
Thus, we suggest evaluating market integration against various measures of riskadjusted price convergence. One approach is to test whether the median risk-adjusted interest rate level is the same across countries (α -convergence). The α -convergence measure captures time-invariant differences such as those caused by the tax and legal system. The σ -convergence and β -convergence measures capture some of the longterm aspects of the integration process while factor convergence also accounts for shortterm movements. Although data limitations do not allow us to determine the precise reasons for possible incompleteness of bank market integration, the use of different convergence measures, in particular the factor convergence measure, could give some indication. For instance, if interest rates exhibit factor convergence but no αconvergence then explanations should rather be found in institutional differences than on the supply side.
We distinguish between small and large bank loans because small loans are dominated by small businesses which are more likely to suffer from monopolistic loan pricing than large scale enterprises (LSEs). In comparison to LSEs, small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) are often more information opaque. This makes the financing of SMEs especially challenging since asymmetric information may create adverse selection and moral hazard problems (see Akerlof, 1970) . The sensitivity of firm growth to cashflow rises as firm size falls (see Carpenter and Petersen, 2002, and Wagenvoort, 2003) for evidence on firms in the USA and the European Union respectively), which may suggest that SMEs encounter finance constraints that prevent them from fully exploiting their growth potential. One way of reducing asymmetric information is to build long relationships with creditors. However, these bank-firm relationships can be exploited to extract monopoly rents from the firms. 2 For instance, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) find for small European businesses that interest rates on loans tend to increase with the duration of a bank-firm relationship.
For the purpose of benchmarking, we also apply the various convergence measures to the primary euro-denominated corporate bond market. A sample of 828 plain-vanilla fixed coupon bonds issued between January 1999 and October 2008 by NFCs in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom is compiled from the Dealogic Bondware data set. The yield-to-maturity of these bonds is adjusted for differences in credit risk before applying the convergence measures. In accordance with the findings of Gabbi and Sironi (2005) , our empirical results suggest that the expected secondary market liquidity is not a significant determinant of primary market bond yields when liquidity is measured by bond size. Hence, despite finding evidence for a negative relationship between transaction issuance costs and bond size, there is no need to adjust the bond yields for liquidity.
Our analysis indicates that the primary euro-denominated bond market can be considered fully integrated since the introduction of the euro. Bond yields move synchronously, i.e. exhibit strong factor convergence, and median yields are equal across countries. In contrast, our results show that the market for bank loans remains segmented albeit to various degrees depending on the type and size of the loan. Small loans with short rate fixation periods are least integrated, indicating that SMEs do not experience a level playing field in their debt financing costs.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formalises the different convergence measures and presents the adopted econometric approaches. Section 3 describes the data sets. The risk and inflation adjustment regressions are shown in Section 4 and Section 5 presents the convergence analysis. Section 6 concludes by summarizing the main findings.
Convergence measures and econometric approaches
Interest rate convergence can be viewed in different ways which together provide us with a more complete picture of the process. One approach is to test whether the median interest rate level is the same across countries (α -convergence). Another approach is to test whether differences between rates are becoming smaller over time (σ -convergence) and/or whether these differences are stationary ( β -convergence), i.e. do not contain long-term trends. Finally, this paper introduces a new approach by testing for the irrelevance of country-specific dynamic factors in the short-and long-term evolution of interest rates (factor convergence).
α-convergence
Let ) ,..., ( 1
. Then, differences in interest rate levels can be measured by: 1 ( ,..., ), 1,...,
The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis (1952) test of median equality is applied to infer the joint statistical significance of ( 1,..., ) i i N α = . We speak of α -convergence when the median interest rates are equal across countries.
σ-convergence
Let 1 var( ,..., ).
The trend in t σ can be estimated by OLS of the regression model:
where t is a time trend, a is a constant and t ε is an error term. We speak of σconvergence when the estimate of parameter b on the time trend is significantly negative, which would suggest that the process of integration is ongoing.
β-convergence
Let
where t B is a benchmark rate in period t. The stationarity of the spreads ti s can be tested by OLS estimation of the error correction model: 
where i η is a country-specific fixed effect, ti ε is an error term, j δ are parameters on the time-lagged change in spreads and i β is the unit root parameter. In the setup of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (see Dickey and Fuller, 1979) , Equation (3) 
Factor convergence
Incomplete β -convergence may be the result of short-term movements in interest rates due to country-specific dynamic factors. To test for the statistical significance of common and non-common factors we perform maximum likelihood factor analysis (see Jöreskog, 1969) . That is, the interest rates are decomposed into: are the associated country-specific factor loadings and ti ε denotes white noise error. We use the EM algorithm (see, Rubin and Thayer 1982) to maximise the likelihood function.
Confidence intervals are estimated by Efron's (1979) bootstrap. Factor k is considered statistically insignificant when the 99% confidence intervals of all loadings 1 ,..., k k N l l include zero and considered statistically significant when the 99% confidence interval of at least one loading does not include zero. Factors can thus be country-specific while not being part of the errors. Loading ki l on factor k associated with country i is considered statistically significantly different from loading kj l associated with country j when at least one of the two loadings is outside the 99% confidence interval of the other loading.
Interest rates are said to exhibit (weak) factor convergence when all factor loadings are significant and all loadings associated with one factor have the same sign. There are then no statistically significant country-specific dynamic factors. However, interest rates may not respond with the same strength to the common factors. For example, when the ECB refinancing rate goes down, loan rates in all countries go down but by more in some countries than in others. Convergence is complete when factor loadings are the same for all countries, in which case there can be only one significant factor. We then speak of strong factor convergence. Under strong factor convergence interest rates move fully synchronously both in the short and long run in the sense that there are no systematic effects in bi-lateral interest rate differences up to a constant.
Definition 1 (weak factor convergence):
For all statistically significant factors
Definition 2 (strong factor convergence): For all statistically significant factors
) percent confidence interval associated with the estimate of the loading kj l . Table 1 provides an overview of the relationships between the various convergence measures. We first compare factor convergence with existing measures. Strong factor convergence implies complete β -convergence, and vice versa, in the sense that one can find a benchmark rate for which all spreads are stationary and white noise. In contrast, weak factor convergence does not necessarily imply β -convergence, neither complete nor incomplete. Indeed, loan rates may exhibit weak factor convergence but still drift apart due to differences in factor loadings. Nor does incomplete β -convergence, i.e. when spreads are stationary but auto-correlated, imply weak factor convergence.
Stationary loan rates may still have persistent country specific components in short-term interest rate movements. Strong factor convergence further implies the absence of σconvergence, for σ -convergence requires differences in factor loadings. When all factor loadings are equal then there is no σ -convergence. Going in the other direction, the absence of σ -convergence, however, is not a sufficient condition for either weak or strong factor convergence, again due to possible persistent country specific components in short-term interest rate movements. Factor convergence and α -convergence are unrelated in the sense that one can hold with or without the other. imply that all interest rates are stationary. For example, some interest rates may converge to the benchmark rate which lowers the cross-sectional variance, while other rates may diverge from the benchmark which increases the cross-sectional variance. These effects on the cross-sectional variance may offset each other while some interest rates are nonstationary. Incomplete β -convergence is not a sufficient condition for the absence of σconvergence since stationary interest rates may still converge. Indeed, a (non-linear) trend in the interest rate spread that dies out over time is stationary. σ -convergence is thus unrelated to incomplete β -convergence. There can be σ -convergence even when some of the interest rates are non-stationary. Finally, both β -convergence and σconvergence are unrelated to α -convergence.
Data description

Bank loan interest rates
This paper analyses monthly interest rates on new business lending to Non-Financial Corporations (NFCs) in eleven euro area countries. New lending includes re-negotiated loans but excludes previously negotiated loans with automatic rate re-setting. Since January 2003 the ECB has reported harmonised interest rates of Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) in the euro area. To get more history, non-harmonised interest rates compiled by the National Central Banks (NCBs) are chain linked with the harmonised MFI interest rates compiled by the ECB. This allows us to construct (risk-adjusted) series that go back to October 1997. Appendix A contains a methodological note with the details of the variable construction.
Loan rates are separately reported for loans with an initial rate fixation period up to one year, hereafter called short loans (STL = Short-Term Loans and long-term loans with short rate fixation periods), and loans with rate fixations periods of more than one year, hereafter called long loans (LTL = Long-Term Loans with long rate fixation periods).
Note that short loans include long-term variable rate loans but exclude overdrafts.
Interest rates for different loan sizes are only available for the harmonized ECB statistics.
Small loans do not exceed EUR 1 million. To some extent large loans (above EUR 1 million) are dominated by large firms with 250 employees or more. (2003) and Wagenvoort (2003) suggest that from a portfolio credit risk viewpoint this may not be justified. A portfolio of loans to small firms is not necessarily riskier than a portfolio of loans to large firms, even when small firms individually are riskier than large firms.
Second, the cross-country variance of small loan rates is higher than the variance of large loan rates. Rates on large loans are thus more uniform across the euro area than rates on small loans. Comparing rate fixation periods (Panel A with Panel C and Panel B with Panel D), we find that rate levels are generally lower, but that cross-country variances are higher on short than on long loans. Long-term rates with long rate fixation periods are thus more uniform than short rates. There is no single country that persistently has the lowest rate for any of the loan categories. Loan rates are generally higher in Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal than in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands and Spain. Part of these cross-country differences in nominal loan rates can be explained by differences in macroeconomic risk and inflation. In Section 4 we adjust the loan rates for these conditions.
Primary bond yields
From the Dealogic Bondware data warehouse we construct a data set of primary market yields on euro-denominated bonds issued by NFCs between January 1999 and October 2008. After risk adjustment (see next section), quarterly averages of the yield to maturity are computed by nationality of the companies. Our sample of 828 plain-vanilla fixed coupon bonds has 0, 3, 9, 4, and 3 missing quarters for France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom respectively, out of a total of 40 quarters per country. We decided to restrict the number of countries to these five so that the share of missing quarters would not exceed 25 percent of observations per country. By enlarging this group with other euro area countries, the share of missing quarters in the country with the least frequent bond issuance would exceed that figure. Note that in four out of the five countries only 10 percent or less of the observations are missing. Missing values in the quarterly series are estimated by inter-and extrapolation of the neighbouring observations. Table 11 of Appendix C shows the main characteristics of the 828 bonds for which face values vary between EUR 20 million and EUR 20 billion.
Adjusting interest rates for risk
Adjusting bank loan rates for systematic risk and inflation
We measure systematic risk ) ( ti R by the standard deviation of (year on year) GDP growth rates over the last twelve quarters as a negative relationship can be expected between the aggregate default rate on national loan portfolios and economic growth.
Actual default rates are not publicly available. Actual inflation over the last twelve months is taken as a proxy for inflation expectations ) ( ti I . 4 In a first step the loan rates ) ( ti r are regressed on these two macroeconomic variables and a set of year dummies in a single equation:
-vector of parameters, and ti ε is an error term. The loan rates are then adjusted as follows:
where ti r is the adjusted loan rate, 1 b and 2 b are OLS estimates of Equation (5) and country j is chosen as benchmark country. Table 2 .
The bank market integration analysis of the Section 5 is performed on the risk and inflation adjusted rates.
Adjusting bond yields for credit risk and liquidity
Let i Spread be the difference between the yield to maturity ) ( i y of bond i and the corresponding swap rate with the same maturity, both at the bond issuance date. The unbalanced sample of 828 bonds is used to regress the bond spread on variables that capture expected secondary market liquidity and credit risk. The liquidity of bond i is measured by the natural logarithm of its face value ) ( i F . Credit risk is picked up by various variables including the bonds' credit rating at issue, time to maturity ) ( i M , and coupon ) ( i C . We expect higher credit risk on bonds with higher coupon and longer maturity. Table 3 shows the OLS estimates of the following linear model:
where c is a constant, t D is a matrix of year dummies, ε is an error term. Rating dummies are defined with respect to bonds rated AA and AAA. In accordance with the findings of Gabbi and Sironi (2005) , we find that bond spreads rise significantly with lower credit ratings and higher coupons, and that bond size is not a significant determinant of bond spreads. However, in contrast with Gabbi and Sironi (2005) and with our expectations, bond spreads fall with higher maturity. 5 This effect is only significant when ratings and coupons are included in the regression and when bonds with maturities of longer than 10 years are included in the sample. 5 The most important differences between our sample and model specification and those of Gabbi and Sironi (2005) , hereafter abbreviated as GS, are as follows. First, our sample is restricted to bonds denominated in euros while the GS sample is restricted to Eurobonds but denominated in different currencies. We compute bond spreads to the corresponding swap rates while GS compute bond spreads to the corresponding Treasury bond rates. Finally, GS include a larger number of explanatory variables. Our more condensed model, however, is sufficiently developed to capture the key differences in credit risk. Using only the statistically significant variables in Table 3 , the bond yields are adjusted for credit risk as follows:
where i ỹ is the adjusted yield to maturity, and 6 1, ..., b b
are OLS estimates of Equation (7). Figure 3 depicts the quarterly averages of the risk-adjusted bond yields that are used in the convergence analysis of the next section. As shown by the figure, there are no apparent systematic differences in risk-adjusted yields across countries, neither in the short-term nor in the long-term. 
Measuring financial market integration
In the following we apply the four convergence measures outlined in Section 2 to the balanced samples of monthly (risk and inflation adjusted) bank loan rates and quarterly (credit risk adjusted) bond yields.
α-convergence: are borrowing costs on average equal across countries?
To assess whether corporate borrowers in Europe pay on average the same interest rate, we compare the median level of interest rates across countries using the Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test. The KW test converges asymptotically to the chi-squared distribution with N-1 degrees of freedom where N denotes the number of interest rates. The critical percentiles associated with the one percent significance level are shown in the last row of Table 4 . As is evident from Table 4 , the corporate bond market exhibits α -convergence since differences between median bond yields are not statistically significant at commonly applied significance levels. In addition to interest expenses, NFCs also bear transaction costs on their bond financing. Appendix B mentions the main cost components of bond issuance and provides some basic descriptive statistics. In accordance with the results on interest expenses, transaction costs also are the same across countries when bond size is considered.
In sharp contrast, α -convergence has not been achieved in the bank loan market. The Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the equality of medians at the 1% significance level for all bank loan categories. Comparing bank loan rates since January 2003, thus focusing on the period since which the euro has been well established and national data have been harmonised, absolute differences in median levels of risk-adjusted bank loan rates are generally larger for small than for large loans, in particular for short loans. Short small (STSL) loans were about 100 b.p. more expensive for German than for French firms. The Given that the average bank loan rate still varies considerably across the euro area, is there evidence that the differences in borrowing costs are diminishing over time and if so, how fast?
σ-convergence: are borrowing costs becoming more uniform over time?
Between January 1999 and October 2008 σ -convergence was absent in the bond market. The coefficient on the time trend in Equation (2) is not statistically significant at the 10 percent or lower significance level (see Table 5 ).
Turning to bank loans, Figure 4a shows the evolution of the cross-country standard deviation of loan rates. There is evidence of strong σ -convergence until December 2000 and weak σ -convergence thereafter. σ -convergence was significant at the 95% level for both short (STL) and long (LTL) loans between January 2001 and September 2008. The speed of convergence for this period averaged -2 and -3 b.p. per annum respectively (see Table 5 ). At such speed (say -3 b.p.) and σ -level (say 50 b.p.) at the end of 2000 it would have taken 25 more years before 95 percent of the loan rates would have had differences smaller than 25 basis points. 6 Figure 4b depicts the evolution of σ by size category. The STSL σ -line is clearly above the lines of the other categories, suggesting that the short small loan segment is the least integrated. There are breaks in the series as from January 2008, for short rates in particular. As suggested by the graph, σ is increasing rapidly due to the financial crisis.
Before the crisis, some series had a weak negative trend. We therefore run the σconvergence regression also for the harmonized series separately for different periods: In sum, there are few signs that bank loan rates continue to converge. Whether or not there are long-term trends in the rate differences is our next convergence criterion.
β-convergence: are differences between borrowing costs mean-reverting?
The β -convergence measure (see Equation 3) requires the choice of a benchmark rate. The empirical findings of Vajanne (2007) underline the difficulty of finding an appropriate benchmark. In her study for example, at the 10 percent significance level short small bank loans are stationary when the lowest loan rate is taken as the benchmark but have a unit root when a market-based swap rate is used. The lowest rate is not necessarily the best choice when the idiosyncratic component of this rate is relatively high. 7 Nor are market rates necessarily a good choice because bank loan rates may wander away from market rates without affecting cross-country differences in bank loan rates.
We choose the benchmark rate in period t to be the average interest rate of that period. The function of our benchmark rate is to minimize the measured differences between the interest rates rather than to set optimal levels to which interest rates are expected to converge.
For this benchmark choice the cross-country differences in risk-adjusted bond yields are stationary. convergence, the speed of convergence is low as many β -estimates are close to zero (see Table 6b ). The absolute value of the median β -estimate is higher for large than for small loans and higher for long than for short loans suggesting in line with the α -convergence 7 Based on this argument, Dunne et al. (2007) for instance propose France as the benchmark for the eurodenominated sovereign bond market at most maturities although German bonds have the lowest yields.
results, that the market for large loans, long loans in particular, is more integrated than the market for small loans. -Sept. 2008 Jan. 2001 -Sept. 2008 0.000 0.000 Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) 0.000 0.000 0.000 Bank loans Jan. 2001 -Sept. 2008 Jan. 2003 -Sept. 2008 Notes: Cases for which the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test rejects the stationarity of the interest rate spread at the five percent or higher level are indicated with an asterisk. ADF tests were performed for each country separately, using the Schwarz information criterion for lag length selection. The number of time periods indicated in the table is therefore approximate. See Appendix D for a glossary.
Up to this point we have looked at convergence criteria that capture long-term differences and trends. Our next and last criterion measures short-term as well as longterm systematic differences in the evolution of loan rates.
Factor convergence: are borrowing costs moving synchronously?
The appealing feature of factor analysis is that factors do not have to be specified ex ante as they are estimated jointly with the factor loadings. We increase the number of latent factors until the last added factor is statistically insignificant for all countries at the 1% significance level. No more than two factors can explain all systematic variation in the bond yields and the bank loan rates. Our results for a model with two factors are shown in Appendix C. Table 12a of Appendix C shows the Maximum Likelihood estimates of the factor loadings for the bank loan rates; Table 12b and Table 12c show the corresponding 0.5 th and 99.5 th percentiles of the bootstrapped factor loadings respectively. Table 13 contains the factor analysis results for the bond yields.
In the case of the bond market, a single factor can account for all systematic variation in the risk-adjusted bond yields. Furthermore, each factor loading is in the 99 percent confidence interval of the other factor loadings. The bond market thus exhibits strong factor convergence. There is no systematic deviation of borrowing cost of companies in one European country in comparison to the borrowing cost of companies in other European countries.
In the case of bank loan rates, for some countries, but not all, two factors are statistically significant for the non-harmonized STL and LTL series, even when only observations since January 2001 are selected, i.e. after the structural break in σconvergence. Factor convergence is thus here absent.
There is however evidence for weak factor convergence of bank loan rates for some of the harmonized series since January 2003. We find that a single factor can account for all systematic variation in the interest rates of loan categories STLL, LTSL and LTLL. In these cases factor loadings are all significant and have the same sign. Convergence here is weak and not strong since some of the factor loadings are outside the 99 percent confidence interval of the other loadings. In other words, although there are no countryspecific dynamic factors that can explain the evolution in the respective series, the sensitivities to the common factor are different, leading to systematic differences in the evolution of borrowing costs across countries. In the case of short small loans (STSL) two factors are statistically significant. Figure 5 depicts the evolution of these factors.
The first STSL factor is strikingly similar to the 6-month Euribor inter-bank rate. The unique factors that can explain the STLL, LTSL, and LTLL loan rates are almost identical to the first STSL factor. The factor loadings on the second STSL factor are, in some cases, statistically insignificant while in other cases they are significantly positive or negative. This means that STSL loan rates are driven by dynamic factors that are not common to all countries. Table 7 summarizes the factor convergence analysis results. Jan. 2001 -Sept. 2008 Jan. 2003 -Sept. 2008 Notes: See Appendix D for a glossary.
Why is the market for short small loans less integrated than the market for long small loans? Long-term loans presumably provide financing for investment whereas short-term loans usually provide working capital. The former loans are more often backed up by collateral than the latter. To the extent that loans with short rate fixation periods contain a larger share of working capital type of financing than loans with long rate fixation periods, short small loans are more susceptible to information problems and, therefore, possibly to distortions in loan pricing. There is no natural law stating that the STSL loan market is necessarily more heterogeneous across countries than the other loan markets.
The explanatory power of the factors is in most cases higher for the bank loan rates than for the bond yields. The adjusted R 2 showing the share of the variance in riskadjusted rates (centred on their mean) that can be explained by the statistically significant factors is between 0.67 and 1.00 for the loans (see Table 12a ) and between 0.42 and 0.70 for the bonds (see Table 13 ). There are two explanations for these differences. Firstly, national loan rates are based on a very large number of individual loan rates whereas some of the quarterly bond rates represent just one firm. Company specific components are thus more important for bonds than for loans. A second and related explanation is the fact that a bond yield on a particular day is likely to give an imprecise estimate of the average funding conditions during a quarter. Although this should not introduce systematic biases, measurement errors are expected to be larger for bonds than for loans.
Conclusion
The novelty of this study is the use it makes of factor analysis to compare NFC borrowing costs in the euro area. Our sample of 828 bond issues suggests that integration of the primary euro-denominated bond market is complete; there is evidence of αconvergence, β -convergence, strong factor convergence, and absence of σconvergence. In contrast, the market for bank loans remains segmented albeit to various degrees depending on the type and size of the loan.
We find that rates on large bank loans and small bank loans with long rate fixation periods exhibit weak factor convergence in the sense that, up to a fixed effect, they are driven by common factors only. In contrast, the evolution of short small loan rates is still affected by country-specific dynamic factors. To the extent that loans with short rate fixation periods contain a larger share of working capital type of financing than loans with long rate fixation periods, short small loans are more susceptible to information problems and, therefore, possibly to distortions in loan pricing.
The factor convergence results resolve some of the ambiguity that follows from βconvergence results which are sensitive to the type of the panel unit root test used.
Notable differences remain in the average cost of bank loans across the euro area, in particular for small loans with short rate fixation periods where some differences are to the order of almost 200 basis points even after adjusting rates for macroeconomic conditions such as systematic risk and inflation. α -convergence is rejected for all loan categories.
There are few signs that bank loan rates are becoming more uniform with time. In 2008 the cross-country variance in loan rates increased as a result of the financial and economic crisis, bringing σ -levels on short loans back to pre-2003 values. There is some evidence of σ -convergence for long large loans albeit with rates converging at low speed.
To conclude, small businesses do not experience a level playing field in their debt financing costs, in particular with respect to the financing of working capital, and there are few signs of improvement. Additional policy efforts are therefore needed to make retail bank markets more competitive.
Appendix A. Methodological note on chain linking NCB and ECB interest rates
This study uses and extends the interest rate time series constructed by Van 
where a i is the aggregate interest rate, s i is the interest rate on small loans, l i is the interest rate on large loans, s s is the share of small loans, and l s is the share of large loans in the volume of new lending. Since
substituting and rearranging (9) gives 
Averages of the shares in (11) 
Note: A = Available; NA = Not Available. See Appendix D for a glossary.
Appendix B. Transaction costs on bond financing
Bond transaction costs possibly consist of four components: the management fee (i.e. the cost of structuring the bond by the underwriter), the selling concession (i.e. the difference between the guaranteed price to the issuer and the offer price to the investors), underpricing (i.e. the difference between the offer price and the secondary market price) and other expenses (i.e. legal and administration costs). The management fee and selling concession make up the bulk of the total transaction cost. A recent study (see Melnik and Nissim, 2006) finds that, since EMU, underpricing has basically disappeared for most bonds. Table 11 ). Transaction costs are thus about the same across countries when bond size is considered. Estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 1% level are indicated with an asterisk. a is a constant, 1 l and 2 l are the loadings on the first and second factors respectively. The adjusted R 2 shows the share of the variance in risk-adjusted bank loan rates (centred on their mean) that can be explained by the statistically significant factors. See Appendix D for a glossary. Note: Estimated factor loadings that are significantly different from zero at the 1% level are indicated with an asterisk. a is a constant, 1 l and 2 l are the loadings on the first and second factors respectively.
Appendix C. Results
C.1. Descriptive statistics
Estimates are based on 10000 draws. The adjusted R 2 shows the share of the variance in risk-adjusted bond yields (centred on their mean) that can be explained by the statistically significant factors. 
Appendix D. Glossary
